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Abstract
This paper deals with discrete-time version of problem as to selecting profitable orders out
of customers sequentially arriving at companies operating in service industries which provide two
classes of services. The first class of service is designed to meet the various needs of their customers,
and the company 1) has an option to accept or reject a particular order (admission control), or
2) decides the price of a particular order to offer to an arriving customer (pricing control). The
second classes of service is provided as a sideline to avoid server’s being idle, and to yield extra
income, referred to as the profit from a sideline; in other words, the second class of service is offered
only when the number of orders for the first class of service is less than the number of servers.
Further, a cost is paid to search for customers, called the search cost. The introduction of the
search cost eventually yields the option as to whether or not to conduct the search. We discuss the
admission control problem and pricing control problem in an identical framework and investigate
the following problems:
1. a) When to accept or reject an arriving order (in admission control problem), or what price
to offer to an arriving customer (in pricing control problem); and b) which type of service to
provide?
2. When to enact the search or skip the search?
3. How many servers to assign to the sideline when the profit from the sideline is sufficiently
large?
We examine and clarify the structure of the optimal decision rule maximizing the total expected
present discounted net profit gained over an infinite planning horizon. Finally, we show that when
the profit from the sideline is large, the optimal policies may not be monotone in the number of
orders in the system.
Keywords: Queueing; Admission control; Pricing control; Profit from a sideline
1 Introduction
In [18] we posed and examined the problem of selecting profitable orders out of customers sequen-
tially arriving at companies operating in service industries which provide two classes of services.
The first class of service is designed to meet the various needs of their customers, and the company
1) has an option to accept or reject a particular order (admission control [1] [2] [6] [11] [19]),
or 2) decides the price of a particular service to offer to an arriving customer (pricing con-
trol [8] [9] [10] [13] [20] [23]). The admission control problem and the pricing control problem
have been separately formulated and examined so far [5] [7] [12] [21]. It was shown in [18] that
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both problems can be discussed in an identical framework and that this result comes from the
fact that the properties of the underlying functions are identical. The second classes of service is
provided as a sideline to avoide server’s being idle, and to yield extra income, referred to as the
profit from a sideline; in other words, the second class of service is offered only when the number
of orders for the first class of service is less than the number of servers.
Our work is motivated by a man power company that places greater emphasis on providing
specialized services (such as human resources recruitment, personnel training, and so on) than
providing temporary staffing as a sideline. Temporary staffing is designed to connect candidates
seeking open positions, who post their resumes in a talent bank in the company through the inter-
net, with clients who are reluctant to make a long term staffing commitment. In a company, when
there exist more orders for specialized services to be handled than the number of servers/teams
will be dispatched or assigned to them. However, when the number of orders accepted so far is
less than that of servers/teams, and thereby some of teams become to be idle, the servers/teams
that are idle will take part in providing temporary staffing as a sideline during that period. The
company charges a fee as a commission for providing this service: The fee is the profit from the
sideline in this case. The strict definition of the subsidiary service is provided in A2 and A3 of the
next section. When the profit obtained from subsidiary services as a sideline is larger than that
from specialized services, the company will naturally place a higher priority on the former than
the latter, or the company will assign some of servers/teams to the latter. Here, a problem arises
in determining the level of profit from the sideline such that if the profit is higher than the level,
1) the company should give the sideline the topmost priority 2) the company should decide the
number of servers/teams to assign to the sideline. In this paper we have succeeded in answering
this problem through the conclusion that the optimal decision rule has a bimodal property in the
number of orders in the system (see Section 8).
From the practical viewpoint that some costs must be paid in order for the company to find
orders; the introduction of the search cost may be an inevitable requirement. The search cost has
been introduced in almost all conventional models of optimal stopping problems [4] [15] [16] [22] but
not in those of customer selection problems. Further, it should be noted that the introduction of
the search cost eventually yields the option as to whether or not to conduct the search. However,
thus far this new option has not been taken into consideration in the models of the customer
selection problems. The decision on whether or not to enact the search may be influenced not only
by the search cost but also the profit from the sideline. In this paper we clarify that if the search
cost or the profit from the sideline is less than a given value, it is optimal to conduct the search
for orders, or else to skip the search.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a strict definition of the model
of the problem treated in the paper. Section 3 describes the optimal equation of the model. In
Section 4 we define some functions, called underlying function. Using these functions, in Section 5
we transform the optimal equation for convenience of discussion in the subsequent sections. In
Section 6 the properties of the optimal decision rule are examined and summarized. Section 7
discusses some important aspects of the problem through numerical experiments, and Section 8
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considers the practical implications of the results obtained in the above sections and summarizes
the conclusions derived.
2 Model
The model examined in the paper is defined on the assumptions below:
A1. The model is defined as a discrete-time sequential stochastic decision process with an infinite
planning horizon. Let points in time be equally spaced on the axis of the planning horizon,
and let the time interval between successive two points in time be called the period.
A2. When the number of particular orders accepted so far is less than that of servers/teams, and
thereby some of teams become to be idle, the servers/teams that are idle will take part in
providing subsidiary services as a sideline during that period, and thereby yields the profit
from the sideline. It is assumed that any subsidiary service can be completed within one
period, implying that the orders of subsidiary service arrriving during that period should be
always accepted. Let the profit obtained from the sideline for one server during one period be
denoted by r ≥ 0.
A3. Only when a search is enacted by paying a search cost s ≥ 0 at a point in time, a particular
order appears at the next point in time with a probability λ ( 0 < λ ≤ 1 ). It is assumed that
the orders of subsidiary service appear without paying search cost.
A4. By N > 1 let us denote the maximum permissible number of orders which can be held in the
system at any instance; a model with N = 1 is examined in [17].
A5. By n ≥ 2 let us denote the number of servers/teams available in the company where n ≤ N .
A6. Let the prices offered by subsequently appearing customers, w,w′, · · · , in the admission
control problem and the maximum permissible ordering prices of subsequently appearing
customers, w,w′, · · · , in the pricing control problem be both independent and identically
distributed random variables having a known continuous distribution function F (w) with a
finite expectation µ. Then, in the pricing control problem, if the system offers a price z to
an appearing customer, the probability of the customer placing the order with the system is
given by
p(z) = Pr{z ≤ w}. (2.1)
In both admission control and pricing control problems, for certain given numbers a and b
(0 < a < b < ∞) let us define the probability density function as follows;
f(w) = 0, w < a, f(w) > 0, a ≤ w ≤ b, f(w) = 0, b < w (2.2)
where clearly a < µ < b. Throughout the paper, for simplicity let us denote the expectation
of a given function g(w) as to w by E [g(w)].
A7. With a probability q ( 0 < q < 1 ) an order in the system at a certain point in time is
completed and goes out of the system at the next point in time.
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A8. Let the discount factor be denoted by β < 1.
Here, note that the decision on the problem is based on the following three rules:
1) The rule whether or not to accept an order from each arriving customer in the admission
control problem.
2) The rule as to the ordering price to offer in the pricing control problem.
3) The rule whether to continue or to skip the search in both problems.
The objective is to find the optimal decision rule so as to maximize the total expected present
discounted net profit gained over an infinite planning horizon, the total expected present discounted
value of prices of orders accepted or placed plus the profits from a sideline minus the total expected
present discounted value of search costs.
For expressional simplicity, by the notations C, K, A, and R let us denote the decisions of,
respectively: continuing the search, skipping the search, accepting an order, and rejecting an
order1 . Further, by the notations 〈C〉, 〈K〉, 〈A〉, and 〈R〉 let us imply that the corresponding
decisions are optimal. 〈A(w)〉 and 〈R(w)〉 denote that it is optimal to accept an appearing
order w and reject it, respectively, in the admission control problem. 〈O(z)〉 denotes that it is
optimal to offer the price z for an order in the pricing control problem.
Further, for convenience in later discussions let us define
α = λβT (0)− c, (2.3)
γ = (1 − β(1 − q))−1 > 1 (2.4)
where it can be easily shown that
1 − γqβ = γ(1 − β) > 0. (2.5)
3 Optimality Equation
In the derivation of the system of the optimal equations of this problem, the following three points
should be noted:
1. In both admission control problem and pricing control problem, by u(φ, i) we shall denote
the maximum total expected present discounted net profits starting from a state of having the
fictitious customer φ and i ( 0 ≤ i ≤ N) orders in the company; let us refer to such a situation as
state (φ, i). If i ≤ n, then n−i production lines will be idle, which implies that the profit from a
sideline (n− i)r is yielded. When in state (φ, N), even if a customer appears, the order cannot
be accepted due to the assumption of i ≤ N ; accordingly, the present state (φ, N) remains
unchanged at the next point in time if no order in the company is completed with probability
1− q.
2. In the admission control problem, by u(w, i) let us denote the maximum total expected present
discounted net profits starting with i ( 0 ≤ i < N) orders in the company and an arriving
customer, who offers a price w.
1We do not use S as a notation representing “skipping the search” because it is often used for representing “stop
the search”
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3. In the pricing control problem, by u(1, i) let us denote the maximum total expected present
discounted net profits starting with i ( 0 ≤ i < N) orders in the company and an arriving
customer, to whom the company proposes a price z for an order.
Since the expectation of immediate reward at any point in time is clearly finite, using the conven-
tional way outlined in the discussion of the Markovian decision process [14, p29-30], we can easily
show that |u(φ, i)| ≤ M/(1− β) for a sufficiently large M > 0, i.e., u(φ, i), u(w, i), and u(1, i) are
bounded in i. Now, for convenience in the later discussions, let us define
hi = u(φ, i)− u(φ, i + 1), 0 ≤ i < N. (3.1)
Then the system of optimal equations can be described as follows:
1. Admission control problem:
u(φ, 0) = max
{
C : β
(
λE[u(ξ, 0)] + (1 − λ)u(φ, 0)
)
− s + nr,
K : βu(φ, 0) + nr
}
, (3.2)
u(φ, i) = max


C : (1− q)β
(
λE [u(ξ, i)] + (1− λ)u(φ, i)
)
+qβ
(
λE[u(ξ, i− 1)] + (1 − λ)u(φ, i− 1)
)
− s,
K : (1− q)βu(φ, i) + qβu(φ, i− 1)


(3.3)
+(n− i)rI(i ≤ n)3, 1 ≤ i < N,
u(φ,N) = max


C : (1− q)βu(φ, N)
+qβ
(
λE[u(ξ,N − 1)] + (1 − λ)u(φ, N − 1)
)
− s,
K : (1− q)βu(φ, N) + qβu(φ,N − 1)

 , (3.4)
u(w, i) = max
{
A : w + u(φ, i + 1),
R : u(φ, i)
}
, (3.5)
= max{w − hi, 0}+ u(φ, i), 0 ≤ i < N. (3.6)
2. Pricing control problem:
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I(·) denotes the indicator function. For the given statement S if S is true, then I(S) = 1, or else I(S) = 0.
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u(φ, 0) = max
{
C : β
(
λu(1, 0) + (1 − λ)u(φ, 0)
)
− s + nr,
K : βu(φ, 0) + nr
}
, (3.7)
u(φ, i) = max


C : (1 − q)β(λu(1, i) + (1 − λ)u(φ, i)
)
+qβ
(
λu(1, i − 1) + (1 − λ)u(φ, i − 1)
)
− s,
K : (1 − q)βu(φ, i) + qβu(φ, i− 1)


(3.8)
+(n− i)rI(i ≤ n), 1 ≤ i < N,
u(φ,N) = max


C : (1 − q)βu(φ, N)
+qβ
(
λu(1,N − 1) + (1 − λ)u(φ, N − 1)
)
− s,
K : (1 − q)βu(φ, N) + qβu(φ,N − 1)

 , (3.9)
u(1, i) = max
z
{p(z)
(
z + u(φ, i + 1)
)
+ (1− p(z))u(φ, i)} (3.10)
= max
z
p(z)(z − hi) + u(φ, i), 0 ≤ i < N. (3.11)
4 Underlying Functions
In this section we define some functions, called underlying functions, and state their properties.
These functions play an important role in analyzing the properties of the optimal decision rule of
the model. For any real number x let us define
T (x) =


E [max{w − x, 0}] for the admission control problem,
max
z
p(z)(z − x) for the pricing control problem,
(4.1)
L(x) = λβT (x)− c, (4.2)
called, respectively, the T - and L-functions where T (0) > 0. In the pricing control problem, by
z(x) let us designate the z attaining the maximum of p(z)(z − x) on (−∞,∞) for a given x if it
exists; i.e., T
(
z(x)
)
= p
(
z(x)
)(
z(x) − x
)
. By using the two T -functions with the same function
name we will show that the two different optimal equations prescribed in the previous section can
be reduced to the identical form of optimal equations in the next section. Noting this result and
the fact that the two T -functions have identical properties (see lemma 6.1 of [18]), we succeeded in
analyzing both problems in an identical framework. However, it should be noted that discussions
as to the optimal prices, which are not seen in the admission control problem, are added to the
pricing control problem (see Lemma 4.1).
Lemma 4.1 For the pricing control problem we get :
(a) z(x) is nondecreasing in x.
(b) There exists a finite x? < a such that if x < (> )x?, then z(x) = (> ) a.
Proof. See [3, Lemmas 6.13, and 6.18].
Note. It is not yet proven which of z(x?) > a or z(x?) = a is true in [3]. If F (w) is a uniform
distribution on [a, b] with 0 < a < b, then x? = 2a− b (See App. B. of [18]).
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5 Transformation
Let us define
v(i) =


E[u(w, i)] for the admission control problem
u(1, i) for the pricing control problem

 , 0 ≤ i < N. (5.1)
Then noting Eq. (4.1), from Eqs. (3.6) and (3.11) we have
v(i) = T (hi) + u(φ, i) or equivalently T (hi) = v(i) − u(φ, i), 0 ≤ i < N. (5.2)
Now, we can immediately rearrange both Eqs. (3.2) to (3.4) and Eqs. (3.7) to (3.9) into the identical
expressions below.
u(φ, 0) = max{λβv(0) + (1 − λ)βu(φ, 0) − s, βu(φ, 0)}+ nr, (5.3)
u(φ, i) = max


(1 − q)β(λv(i) + (1− λ)u(φ, i)
)
+qβ
(
λv(i− 1) + (1 − λ)u(φ, i− 1)
)
− s,
(1 − q)βu(φ, i) + qβu(φ, i − 1)


(5.4)
+(n − i)rI(i ≤ n), 1 ≤ i < N, (5.5)
u(φ,N) = max
{
(1− q)βu(φ, N) + qβ
(
λv(N − 1) + (1− λ)u(φ, N − 1)
)
− s,
(1− q)βu(φ, N) + qβu(φ,N − 1),
}
, (5.6)
Further, Eqs. (5.3) to (5.6) can be rewritten as, respectively,
u(φ, 0) = βu(φ, 0) + max{λβ
(
v(0)− u(φ, 0)
)
− s, 0}+ nr, (5.7)
u(φ, i) = (1− q)βu(φ, i) + qβu(φ, i− 1) + (n− i)rI(i ≤ n) + max{λ(1− q)β(v(i) − u(φ, i))
+λqβ
(
v(i − 1) − u(φ, i − 1)
)
− s, 0}, 1 ≤ i < N, (5.8)
u(φ,N) = (1− q)βu(φ, N) + qβu(φ,N − 1) + max{λqβ
(
v(N − 1) − u(φ,N − 1)
)
− s, 0}, (5.9)
which can be immediately rearranged into
u(φ, 0) =
(
max{λβ
(
v(0)− u(φ, 0)
)
− s, 0}+ nr
)
/(1− β), (5.10)
u(φ, i) = γqβu(φ, i − 1) + γ(n − i)rI(i ≤ n) + γ max{λ(1− q)β
(
v(i) − u(φ, i)
)
+λqβ
(
v(i− 1)− u(φ, i− 1)
)
− s, 0}, 1 ≤ i < N, (5.11)
u(φ,N) = γqβu(φ,N − 1) + γ max{λqβ
(
v(N − 1) − u(φ,N − 1)
)
− s, 0} (5.12)
where γ is defined by Eq. (2.4). Hence, using Eq. (5.2), we can rewrite Eqs. (5.10) to (5.12) as
follows.
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u(φ, 0) = (max{λβT (h0)− s, 0}+ nr)/(1− β), (5.13)
u(φ, i) = γqβu(φ, i− 1) + γ(n− i)rI(i ≤ n)
+γ max{λ(1− q)βT (hi) + λqβT (hi−1)− s, 0}, 1 ≤ i < N, (5.14)
u(φ,N) = γqβu(φ,N − 1) + γ max{λqβT (hN−1) − s, 0}. (5.15)
Further, using the L-function defined by Eq. (4.2), we can rewrite Eqs. (5.13) to (5.15) as follows.
u(φ, 0) = (max{L(h0), 0} + nr)/(1− β), (5.16)
u(φ, i) = γqβu(φ, i− 1) (5.17)
+γ max{(1− q)L(hi) + qL(hi−1), 0}+ γ(n − i)rI(i ≤ n), 1 ≤ i < N,
u(φ,N) = γqβu(φ,N − 1) + γ max{qL(hN−1)− (1− q)s, 0}. (5.18)
Below, for convenience let
Q0 = L(h0), (5.19)
Qi = (1− q)L(hi) + qL(hi−1), 1 ≤ i < N, (5.20)
QN = qL(hN−1)− (1 − q)s. (5.21)
Then Eqs. (5.16) to (5.18) can be rewritten as follows.
u(φ, 0) = (max{Q0, 0}+ nr)/(1− β), (5.22)
u(φ, i) = γqβu(φ, i− 1) + γ max{Qi, 0}+ γ(n − i)rI(i ≤ n), 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (5.23)
Regarding hi as a function of r, let us represent hi and Qi by, respectively, hi(r) and Qi(r), i.e.,
Q0(r) = L(h0(r)), (5.24)
Qi(r) = (1 − q)L(hi(r)) + qL(hi−1(r)), 1 ≤ i < N, (5.25)
QN (r) = qL(hn−1(r))− (1 − q)s. (5.26)
Here, by ri let us denote the smallest solution of Qi(r) = 0, if it exists, i.e.,
ri = min{r
∣∣ Qi(r) = 0}. (5.27)
From all the above it can be easily seen that the optimal decision rules for any given i can be
prescribed as follows.
Optimal Decision Rule 5.1
1. Admission control problem:
i. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ N . If Qi > 0, then 〈C〉i, or else 〈K〉i.
ii. Let 0 ≤ i < N and an order with value w appear after the search was enacted. If w > hi,
then 〈A(w)〉i, or else 〈R(w)〉i.
2. Pricing control problem:
8
i. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ N . If Qi > 0, then 〈C〉i, or else 〈K〉i.
ii. Let 0 ≤ i < N and a customer appear after the search was enacted. Then 〈O(z)〉 where
zi = z(hi).
6 Analysis
Lemma 6.1 Let α ≤ 0. Then Qi ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Proof. Proven in the same way as in the proof of lemma 6.5 of [18] we can prove the assertion.
Lemma 6.2 For a given i such that n ≤ i < N we have:
(a) If Qi ≤ 0, then hi−1 > hi, hence hi−1 ≥ hi.
(b) If hi−1 < hi, then hi−1 < hi < · · · < hn−1 < b and Qj > 0 for j with i ≤ j < N .
(c) If Qi > 0, then Qj > 0 for i ≤ j < N .
Proof. Proven in the same as in the proofs of, respectively, lemmas 6.6(b), 6.7, and 6.9 of [18].
Corollary 6.1 If hi−1 ≤ hi, then hi−1 ≤ hi ≤ · · · ≤ hM−1 < b and Qj > 0 for j with i ≤ j < N .
Proof. Proven in the same way as in the proof of lemma 6.2(b).
Lemma 6.3
(a) hi(r) is nondecreasing in r for i ≥ 0.
(b) limr→∞ hi(r) = ∞ and limr→−∞ hi(r) = −∞ for i ≥ 0.
(c) Qi(r) is nonincreasing in r for all i ≥ 0.
(d) For 0 ≤ i ≤ n we have:
1 There exists ri > 0.
2 If r < (≥) ri, then Qi(r) > (≤) 0.
Proof. Proven in the same way as in the proofs of, respectively, lemmas 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13
of [18].
Lemma 6.4
(a) Let r = 0.
1 Q0(r) > 0.
2 If h0 = 0, then hi is nondecreasing in i.
3 If h0 > 0, then hi is strictly increasing in i.
(b) If rn ≤ r, then hn−1 > hn.
Proof. (a) Proven in the same way as in the proofs of lemma 6.14(a) of [18].
(b) Let rn ≤ r. Then from Lemma 6.3(d2) we have Qn(r) ≤ 0, hence hn−1 > hn due to
Lemma 6.2(a).
Let us define
rˆ = min{r
∣∣ hn−1(r) > hn(r)}. (6.1)
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Lemma 6.5 We have rn ≥ rˆ > 0 where if r ≥ (<) rˆ, then hn−1 > (≤) hn.
Proof. From Lemma 6.4 we have hn−1 ≤ hn for r = 0 and hn−1 > hn for r ≥ rn, implying that
there exists a positive rˆ ≤ rn such as hn−1(r) > hn(r). Accordingly, the latter half of the assertion
is clearly true.
From the results obtained so far, we have the following theorem restating Optimal Decision Rule
5.1.
Theorem 6.1
(a) Let α ≤ 0. Then 〈K〉
0≤i≤N .
(b) Let α > 0.
1 Let rn ≤ r. Then 〈K〉n≤i<N or there exists i
∗(n < i∗ < N ) such that 〈K〉n≤i<i∗ and
〈C〉i∗≤i<N .
2 Let r < rn.
i 〈C〉n≤i<N .
ii Let rˆ ≤ r. Then hi is not always nondecreasing in i ≥ n.
iii Let r = 0.
1 If h0 = 0, then hi is nondecreasing in i with hi < b for 0 ≤ i < N .
2 If h0 > 0, then hi is strictly increasing in i with hi < b for 0 ≤ i < N .
Proof. (a) Evident from Lemma 6.1.
(b) Let α > 0. Here note that rˆ ≤ rn from Lemma 6.5.
(b1) Let rn ≤ r. Clearly Qn(r) ≤ 0 from Lemma 6.3(d2) with i = n, hence 〈K〉n. From this
result and the fact that once continuing the search is optimal for a certain i, i.e., 〈C〉i, then it also
is so for all i′ with i ≤ i′ < N due to Lemma 6.2(c). Accordingly, the assertion clearly holds.
(b2) Let r < rn.
(b2i) Then QN (r) > 0 from Lemma 6.3(d2) with i = n, hence Qi(r) > 0 for n ≤ i < N from
Lemma 6.2(c), thus 〈C〉n≤i<N .
(b2ii) Let rˆ ≤ r. Then since hn−1 > hn from Lemma 6.4(b), it follows that hi is not always
nondecreasing in i.
(b2iii) Let r = 0.
(b2iii1,b2iii2) Immediate from Lemmas 6.4(a).
In the pricing control problem it should be noted that the monotonicity of hi in i stated above is
inherited to the optimal price zi due to Lemma 4.1(a). Since zi = z(hi), from Lemma 4.1(b) we
see that zi = a if hi < x?.
7 Numerical Experiments
Let us examine the properties of the optimal decision rules through numerical experiments.
7.1 Admission Control Problem
Let F (w) be the uniform distribution on [0.01,1.01] and let λ = 0.95, q = 0.35, β = 0.99, s = 0.01,
and N = 15. In this case, T (0) = 0.51, hence α = λβT (0)− s = 0.47 > 0. Then for rˆ, rn, and
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hn−1 ' hn, n = 2,3,4,5, we obtain the results of numerical experiments shown in Table 7.1. Here
note that it is only when r = rˆ that hn−1 ' hn may occurs due to the definition of rˆ given by
Eq. (6.1).
Table 7.1: rˆ, rn, and hn−1 ' hn.
n = 4n = 3n = 2 n = 5
hn−1 ' hn '
rn '
rˆ ' 0.019 0.007 0.005 0.005
0.121 0.064 0.041 0.030
0.340 0.373 0.389 0.404
I. Relationship among rˆ, r0, and h
  .
Figure 7.1 depicts the relationships of hi with the number of back orders i and the profit from
a sideline r. The figure tells us that:
1. hi is nondecreasing in the profit from a sideline r for all i.
2. If r < rˆ, then hi is strictly increasing in i ≥ 0.
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Figure 7.1: Graphs of the selection criterion hi in the number of backorders i.
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3. If r = rˆ, then hn−1 ' hn and hi is strictly increasing in i ≥ n.
4. If rˆ ≤ i < rn, then there exist i
′ and i′′ such that hi is strictly increasing in i ≤ i
′, strictly
decreasing in i′ < i ≤ i′′, and again strictly increasing in i ≥ i′′.
5. If i is sufficiently large, then hi coincides with hi for r = 0.000. This reflects the fact that
the larger the number of back orders may become, the smaller the possibility of the back
orders being exhausted may get; as a result, the effect of r on hi is gradually diminished.
II. The optimal decision rules on continuing or skipping the search.
Table 7.2 represents the optimal decision rules on continuing the search or skipping the search
in each state for each given r. Table 7.2 tells us that:
Table 7.2: Optimal decision rules on continuing or skipping the search.
in, rn
r = 0.000
r = 0.121
r = 0.136
r = 0.150
r = 0.000
r = 0.063
r = 0.065
r = 0.100
r = 0.000
r = 0.040
r = 0.071
r = 0.100
r = 0.000
r = 0.029
r = 0.071
r = 0.310
n = 2
n = 3
n = 4
n = 5
rn = 0.121
rn = 0.064
rn = 0.041
rn = 0.030
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉
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〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉
〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉
〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈K〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉
〈C〉 〈C〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈K〉
〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈C〉
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〈C〉 〈C〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈K〉 〈C〉 〈C〉 〈K〉
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1. If r < rn, then it is always optimal to continue the search as seen Theorem 6.1(b2i)
except for the state (φ, 15). When i = 15, any of continuing the search and skipping may
be optimal,
2. If r ≥ rn, implying that if the profit from a sideline r is sufficiently large, it can be seen
that it is always optimal to skip the search (case of n = 5 and r = 0.310) or that there
exists i
′
< i
′′
such that if i < i
′
, continuing the search is optimal, if i
′
≤ i ≤ i
′′
, skipping
the search is optimal, and if i
′′
< i, again continuing the search is optimal; that is, there
exist double critical values in terms of i. In case of n = 2 and r = 0.150 we have i
′
= 2
and i
′′
= 7.
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Figure 7.2: Graphs of hi and zi.
7.2 Pricing Control Problem
Let F (w) be the uniform distribution on [2, 3], i.e., a = 2 and b = 3 and let λ = 0.90, q = 0.55,
β = 0.99 and s = 0.05. In this case, we have x? = 2a−b = 1. Since x? > 0, we obtain T (0) = a = 2,
hence α = λβT (0)− s = 1.732 > 0.
Figure 7.2 depicts the relationships of hi and zi(= z(hi)) with the number of back orders i and
the profit from a sideline r. The figures tell us that:
1. hi is nondecreasing in the profit from a sideline r for all i.
2. If r < rˆ, then hi is strictly increasing in i ≥ 0.
3. If r = rˆ, then hn−1 ' hn and zi is strictly increasing in i ≥ n.
4. If rˆ ≤ i < rn, then there exist i
′ and i′′ such that hi and zi is strictly increasing in i ≤ i
′,
strictly decreasing in i′ ≤< i ≤ i′′, and again strictly increasing in i ≥ i′′. We can notice that
i′ is given by n− 1.
5. The graph on the right shows the optimal ordering price zi. Here note that there exists i such
that hi < x
? = 2a − b = 1 in the graph of hi. Since zi = z(hi) = a for hi < x
? = 1 due to
Lemma 4.1(b), it follows that zi = z(hi) for such i becomes equal to a = 2; in other words,
zi = z(hi) is truncated by a, the low bound of the distribution function F (w). Further, it should
be noted that there exists hi < a such that its corresponding optimal ordering price zi becomes
greater than a, i.e., zi = z(hi) > a.
8 Conclusions and Considerations
First, it should be noted that the following two opportunity losses are closely related to the
customer selection problem.
1. Opportunity loss I . Suppose there are great deal of particular orders in the system. Then
the service capacity soon becomes full; with the result that orders from customers arriving
thereafter can not be accepted, however high their profitabilities may be. This leads to the
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opportunity loss that if adequate allowance were kept in the service capacity by having rejected
less profitable orders in advance, the company could have enjoyed accepting upcoming profitable
orders. We shall refer to this loss as Opportunity loss I.
2. Opportunity loss II . Suppose the profit from a sideline is sufficiently small. Then excessively
refraining from accepting particular orders due to the apprehension that Opportunity loss I
could occur causes a decrease in the number of orders in the system. This time, many servers
may soon become idle and they should be assigned to the sideline with relatively small profit,
causing the opportunity loss that if more particuar orders had been accepted in advance, profit
could have been gained from them. We shall refer to this loss as Opportunity loss II.
Next, below let us state the two types of oscillations as to the number of particular orders i in the
system.
1. On the range of i over which the optimal selection criterion hi is increasing in i, the number
of particular orders i in the system oscillates with an equilibrium point for the same reason as
that stated in Section 9 of [18] (r < rˆ of C2); let us refer to such behavior of i as the stable
oscillation.
2. On the range of i over which the optimal selection criterion hi is decreasing in i, the number of
particular orders i in the system oscillates as follows: (1) The smaller the number of particular
orders in the system may become, the higher the optimal selection criterion hi becomes; as
a result, the number of particular orders in the system is prompted to become further small
and (2) The larger the number of particular orders i in the system may become, the lower the
optimal selection criterion hi gets; as a result, the number of particular orders in the system
is prompted to become further large. This fact suggests that once the i enters this range,
it behaves as if it is escaping from the region. Let us refer to such behavior as the unstable
oscillation.
The optimal decision rules described in theorem 6.1 are almost similar to those of [18]. However,
the conclusions obtained from this problem are different from those in [18] in the sense below.
First, it should be noted that there exist rˆ and rn with rˆ < rn (2 ≤ n ≤ N), which provides
thresholds implying that: (1) If the profit from a sideline r is less than rˆ, the optimal selection
criterion hi is increasing in the number of particular orders i in the system, or else it is bimodal
in i and (2) If the profit from a sideline r is less than rn, it is optimal to conduct the search for
orders, or else it is not always optimal to enact the search. Below, let us explain the implications
of the above two thresholds:
1. Let r < rˆ, i.e., the profit from a sideline is sufficiently small. Then the optimal selection criterion
hi is increasing in the number of particular orders i in the system. Hence, the behavior of the
number of particular orders in the system shows the stable oscillation.
2. Let rˆ ≤ r < rn. In this case, as seen in Figure 7.1, there exist i
′ and i′′ (i′ < i′′) such that
hi is strictly increasing on [0, i
′], strictly decreasing on (i′, i′′], and again strictly increasing on
(i′′, N ]. In other words, the optimal selection criterion hi is bimodal in the number of particular
orders i in the system over [0,N ]. Below, let us state the implications of the bimodal property.
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i. Let i ≤ i′. Then the optimal selection criterion hi is increasing in the number of particular
orders i in the system. This fact implies the following. If there are few particular orders
in the system, all the servers will become soon idel, and the company has to assign these
all servers to the sideline with a relatively small amount of profit. This yields Opportunity
loss II. Accordingly, in order to avoid this loss, the optimal selection criterion hi should
be set low to accept orders even though their profitabilities may not be so high. However,
as the number of particular orders i increases, the service capacity comes to be filled with
paricular orders, leading to the possibility of obtaining an income from a sideline is small.
This yields Opportunity loss I. Therefore, in order to avoid this loss and prevent all the
production lines from being full with orders, the optimal selection criterion should be set
high; as a result, the number of particular orders i becomes small, hence the company can
enjoy the profit from a sideline.
ii. Let i′ < i. Then the optimal selection criterion hi is unimodal in the number of particular
orders i over (i′, N ]; the managerial implication of this unimodality is the same as that
stated in Section 9 of [18] (rˆ ≤ r < r0 of C2).
iii. The fact that the optimal selection criterion hi is increasing on each of the two ranges,
[0, i′] and (i′′, N ], implies that there exists a stable point of oscillation on each of the two
ranges. Once the number of particular orders i enters the range (i′, i′′], a dynamics starts
operating to prompt the number of particular orders i to move to one of the two ranges [0, i′]
and (i′′, N ] since the behavior of the number of particular orders shows unstable oscillation.
Here, it is to be noted that the stable points on [0, i′] and (i′′, N ] are related to, respectively,
the number of production lines to be fulled with orders and the number of particular orders
to be held in the system.
iv. The fact that hi is a bimodal function of i suggests us the following. For an order with
certain price w there exists i
′
< i
′′
< i
′′′
such that if i ≤ i
′
, it is optimal to reject the order,
if i
′
< i ≤ i
′′
, it is optimal to accept it, if i
′′
< i ≤ i
′′′
, again it is optimal to reject it, and
i
′′′
< i, again it is optimal to accept it. In other words, there exist the triple critical values
in terms of i at which rejecting and accepting an order become indifferent.
3. Let rn ≤ r, i.e., the profit from a sideline is sufficiently large. Then the optimal selection
criterion hi may be monotone, unimodal, or bimodal in i. However, since no order appears
on the range where it is optimal to skip the search (see Table 7.2), the hi has no practical
meaning as a selection criterion. Now, as seen in Table 7.2, there exist two critical values i
′
and i
′′
(i
′
< i
′′
). The i′ provides the number of servers to be assigned to provide the specialized
services (particular orders), so that the number of servers to be assigned to the sideline will be
given as n− i′. The i′′ provides the number of particular orders up to which skipping the search
is optimal. Further, we see that:
i. If i ≤ i
′
, then i
′
servers are all available for handling particular orders and it is optimal to
conduct the search for orders until the number of particular orders becomes i′.
ii. If i
′
< i < i
′′
, it is optimal to skip the search; as a result, the number of particular orders
in the system decreases up to i′. Hence, it becomes possible to assign n− i′ servers to the
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sideline, and thereby yields a profit from the sideline.
iii. If i
′′
≤ i, the company shoul again conduct the search for orders to make profit.
The above stated considerations are related to the admission control problem. The same consid-
erations as those stated above are also obtained for the pricing control problem.
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